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THE DIRECTIVE ON CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS FOR MARKET ABUSE:
A MOVE TOWARDS HARMONIZING
INSIDER TRADING CRIMINAL LAW
AT THE EU LEVEL?
Michael G. Faure and Claire Leger
INTRODUCTION
For a long time, it was generally held that the European Union (EU)
had no competence in the area of criminal law. The EU issued directives,
but Member States individually determined methods of implementing the
directives in their States. As such, the directive’s consequence, rather than a
State’s chosen instrument, was binding.
However, the European Commission has forced Member States to
penalize violations of national legislation derived from EU directives with
criminal sanctions, beginning with issues of environmental law. Indeed, in a
September 2005 landmark decision, the European Court of Justice ruled
that when the application of effective, proportionate, and dissuasive
criminal penalties by national authorities are essential for combating serious
environmental offenses, criminal law may be prescribed to ensure that
national laws on environmental protection are fully effective. 1 The
European Commission has exercised these powers through the so-called
Environmental Crime Directive of 19 November 2008 2 and Directive
2009/123 on Ship Source Pollution of 21 October 2009.3 The powers of the
EU to force Member States to use criminal law have now also been laid
down in the Lisbon Treaty.4
Although initially limited to the domain of environmental criminal law,
the Commission apparently intends to extend the application of EU criminal
 Professor of comparative and international environmental law, Maastricht University and
Professor of comparative private law and economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam. At the time
of writing Michael Faure was haiwaimingshi (distinguished visiting professor) at the Centre for
Law and Economics of the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) in Beijing,
China.
 Doctor, European Doctorate in Law and Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam;
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laboratory.
1. See Case C-176/03, The Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. I-7907.
2. Council Directive 2008/99, On the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
2008 O.J. (L 328) 28. Member states were required to implement this Directive by December 26,
2010.
3. Council Directive 2009/123, Amending Directive 2005/35 on the Ship-Source Pollution
and on the Introduction of Penalties for Infringements, 2009 O.J. (L 280) 52. It had to be
transposed by November 16, 2010.
4. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1, art. 69 B(2) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
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law to the area of economic law, particularly insider trading. The Directive
on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57/EU (the Directive), entered
into force on April 16, 2014, 5 introduced minimum rules on criminal
offences to be transposed into national criminal law and applied by the
criminal justice systems of the Member States. This Directive aligns with
the Commission’s policy to increasingly introduce EU minimum criminal
law standards into other areas of law, on the grounds that only criminal law
can demonstrate social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature than
civil law’s administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under
civil law.6 As Member States’ enforcement practices significantly diverge,
the Commission argues that this may provide incentives for people to carry
out market abuse in the Member States that do not provide for criminal
sanctions for these offences or that provide weak enforcement.
This Article critically analyzes the Directive criminalizing insider
trading at the EU level from a legal and an economic perspective. In that
respect, this Article considers the following question: even if criminal laws
may be necessary in particular circumstances, should such laws should be
introduced at the EU level? The economic theory of federalism, which
analyzes the division of labor between the Member States and the EU, can
be used to analyze whether criminalization should be implemented at the
EU level.7 The study further analyzes whether this Directive is consistent
with the fundamental principles of European criminal law. An alternative
would obviously be to respect the subsidiarity principle and to allow
Member States to decide on the necessity of criminalization in particular
circumstances.
This Article will contribute both to the economic theory of
criminalization and to the economic theory of federalism by (1) studying
which economic criteria criminalization of insider trading are necessary, (2)
discussing whether such criminalization should be imposed on the EU or
alternatively, on the Member State level, and (3) determining the
appropriate guiding legal principles. Further, this discussion will have
practice and policy implications as it sheds a critical light, under an
economic analysis, on the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse.
This Article will be structured as follows: (I) an introduction to the
legal background of harmonization of criminal and insider trading laws in
the EU and the contents of the Directive on criminal sanctions for market
abuse are outlined; (II) a consideration of whether insider trading should be
5. Council Directive 2014/57, On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, 2014 O.J. (L 173)
179.
6. This motivation was expressed throughout the directive, but is stated explicitly in the
preamble to Council Directive 2008/99. On the Protection of the Environment through Criminal
Law, supra note 2, pmbl.
7. For an overview of the economics of federalism, see Roger Van den Bergh, Towards an
Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe, 53 KYKLOS 435 (2000).
2015] Towards Harmonizing Insider Trading Criminal Law 389
criminalized is considered; and then, (III) a discussion of whether such
criminalization should be realized at the EU level or (IV) whether
criminalization should be implemented at the Member State level.
I. LEGAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND: CONTEXT OF THE
DIRECTIVE ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR MARKET
ABUSE
A. HARMONIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE EU
1. Criminal law is traditionally a State sovereignty matter
Criminal law is one of the fundamental expressions of State
sovereignty: the right to punish. Criminal law intrinsically expresses
society’s fundamental values by determining its censurable behaviors, and
criminal procedure provides the process through which criminally
sanctioned conduct is made an offence. Criminal law results in the
confrontation of the State’s right to punish and the guarantee of citizens’
civil liberties. For these reasons, the rules relating to criminal law fall
within the competence of the legislature, and parliamentary democratic
oversight is strongly involved in its elaboration.
Criminal law embodies other fundamental societal values such as
culture, religion, and history. Within the EU, criminal law differs from one
country to another. Consequently, as presented in a European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) report, Member States may unequally punish
the same behavior, procedures may not correspond to the same demands,
and the nature of sanctions may diverge significantly.8
2. EU criminal law
Historically, it has been held that the EU had no competence in the area
of criminal law. Indeed, EU criminal law is a contested field of EU action
because it presents a challenge to State sovereignty in this potentially
tougher domain of law. Consequently, EU’s authority in criminal law is
limited because it can only address criminal sanctions through the issuance
of Directives.
Behind the use of criminal law, there is the will of the Commission to
“demonstrate a stronger form of social disapproval compared to
administrative penalties” and to “send a message to the public and to
potential offenders that competent authorities take such behaviour very
seriously.”9
8. See ESMA, REPORT: ACTUAL USE OF SANCTIONING POWERS UNDER MAD (2012),
available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2012-270.pdf.
9. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, pmbl. recital 6. See also On the
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, supra note 2, pmbl. recital 3: “criminal
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3. Before the Lisbon Treaty
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the three pillars of the EU
legal structure. 10 The third pillar was dedicated to police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters (PJCC).11 The Maastricht Treaty was the
beginning of the creation of a European criminal law enforcement area.12
Nevertheless, before the Lisbon Treaty, because of the lack of an explicit
legal basis, only very few measures have been taken for the purpose of
strengthening the enforcement of EU policies via criminal law.13
This changed with the decision of the Court of Justice on September 13,
2005, in C-176/03. In this case, the Court argued that although,
as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure
fall within the community competence . . . . the last-mentioned finding
does not prevent the community legislature, when the application of
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent
national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious
environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal
law of the Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure
that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully
effective.14
In a second decision on October 23, 2007, in case C-440/05, the Court
of Justice, however, specified: “By contrast, and contrary to the submission
of the Commission, the determination of the type and level of the criminal
penalties . . . demonstrate a social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to
administrative penalties or a compensation mechanism under civil law.”
10. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of
Maastricht].
11. Called “Justice and Home Affairs” (JHA) from 1993 until the implementation of the
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 1.
12. Before Maastricht, measures were not really taken to create a European criminal justice
system. The Council of Europe attempted to create interoperable judicial systems for its members
by addressing the issue of “mutual assistance in criminal matters” through two conventions
respectively on extradition (1957; CETS No.:02) and mutual assistance (1959; CETS No.:03) in
criminal matters. Moreover, TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence International)
was the forum of the operational cooperation between ministries of justice and internal affairs of
the Member States from 1975 until 1993. The Schengen Treaty of 14 June 1985 was one of the
first steps towards operational cooperation in criminal matters in the EU. It was executed through
the Schengen Convention of 19 June 1990 and the Schengen acquis, art. 39, 2000 O.J. (L 239).
“The Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their police authorities shall, in compliance with
national law and within the scope of their powers, assist each other for the purposes of preventing
and detecting criminal offences.” Id.
13. See Council Framework Decision, On Increasing Protection Against Counterfeiting by
Criminal Penalties and Other Sanctions Against Counterfeiting in Connection with the
Introduction of the Euro, 2000 O.J. (L 140) 1; Communication of the Commission Towards an EU
Criminal Policy: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of EU Policies Through Criminal Law,
COM (2011) 573 final (Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Towards an EU Criminal Policy].
14. Case C-176/03, The Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. Council of the European Union,
2005 E.C.R. I-7907.
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penalties to be applied does not fall within the community’s sphere of
competence.”15 In that decision, the Court of Justice clarified that within the
conditions set by the decision of September 13, 2005, the Commission may
prescribe the use of criminal penalties (if the necessity conditions are
fulfilled and the topic falls within its sphere of competence).16 However, the
Court held that EU is clearly not competent to “determine the type and level
of the criminal penalties to be applied.”17
As it was already made clear in the introduction to this Article, the
European Commission has used the new powers that were allocated to it
with the promulgation of two criminal law directives.18 Both directives were
implemented by the end of 2010. Since then, the legal framework has
changed considerably as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon.
4. The Lisbon Treaty
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty19 introduced three specific competences to
the European Union for criminal law, providing for a new legal framework
for criminal legislation and giving a strong role to the European Parliament,
the European Council, and the European Court of Justice. The new legal
framework under the Lisbon Treaty aims at providing means to develop
consistent and coherent EU criminal law legislation. It allows the Member
States to work together with the European Parliament, the Council of the
European Union and the European Commission20 by providing a stronger
role for national parliaments in the field of criminal law than in the context
of other EU policies.21 They can give their views on proposals and monitor
the respect of the principle of subsidiarity.22 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty
15. Case C-440/05, The Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. Council of the European Union,
2007 E.C.R I-9128.
16. Id. ¶ 24 provides that “the Community is empowered to require Member States to provide
for penalties—including, if appropriate, criminal penalties—at national level, where this proves
necessary in order to achieve a Community objective.”
17. For further details see Michael Faure, The Continuing Story of Environmental Criminal
Law in Europe after 23 October 2007, 17 EUR. ENERGY&ENVTL. L. 74 (2008).
18. On the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, supra note 2; Amending
Directive 2005/35 on the Ship-Source Pollution and on the Introduction of Penalties for
Infringements, supra note 3.
19. The Lisbon Treaty amended the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) and the
Treaty of Rome (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community), both of which formed
the constitutional basis of the European Union. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 4. See also
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty of Rome was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU). Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
20. These are the three main institutions involved in EU legislation making. Towards an EU
Criminal Policy, supra note 13, at 4.
21. See Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83)
203.
22. See TFEU, supra note 19; TEU, supra note 19; Protocol on the Application of the
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, art. 7(2), 2010 O.J. (C 83) 206 (“Where reasoned
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made the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding, thus providing a
high level of protection for citizens.23
Finally, when a Member State determines that a proposal dealing with
criminal law or criminal procedure touches upon fundamental aspects of its
national criminal justice system, it has the option to refer it to the European
Council.24Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) defines the substantive competences of the European Union
in criminal matters by providing two specific legal bases for substantive
criminal law.25
First, according to Article 83(1) TFEU,26 the EU can adopt directives
providing for minimum rules regarding the definition of criminal offences
for the listed “Euro crimes”: terrorism, human trafficking and sexual
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of
payment, computer crime and organized crime. 27 “Euro crimes” are crimes
of a serious nature with cross-border dimensions, and are therefore thought
to merit EU-level approaches. Directive 2014/62/EU, which focuses on the
protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting by
criminal law,28 was adopted on the basis of this article.
Secondly, Article 83(2) TFEU allows the European Parliament and the
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, to establish “minimum rules
with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions if the
approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States
opinions on a draft legislative act’s non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at
least one third of all the votes allocated to the national Parliaments in accordance with the second
subparagraph of paragraph 1, the draft must be reviewed.”).
23. Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13.
24. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 83(3). See also Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13,
at 4.
25. SAMULIMIETTINEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEANUNION 42 (2012).
27. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 83(1):
The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules concerning
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious
crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis. These areas of
crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation
of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and
organised crime.
On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying
other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
28. Council Directive 2014/62/EU, On the Protection of the Euro and Other Currencies
Against Counterfeiting by Criminal Law and Replacing Council Framework Decision
2000/383/JHA, 2014 O.J. (L 151) 1.
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proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in
an area which has been subject to a harmonization measure.”29
In addition, Article 325(4) TFEU allows Member States to take
measures against the misuse of EU public money and fraud affecting the
financial interests of the Union.
The Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse is based on
Article 83(2) TFEU. It should be added that, on September 20, 2011, the
Commission issued the Communication “Towards an EU Criminal Policy:
Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law”
(the Communication), intending to provide, amongst other things, some
specific guidance regarding Article 83(2) TFEU.30 This Article provides the
possibility for EU institutions to determine which EU policies require the
use of criminal law as an additional enforcement tool.
The Treaty explicitly requires a test of whether criminal law measures
are “essential” to achieve the goal of an effective policy implementation.
According to the Communication, the Commission must carry out an
assessment of the national enforcement regimes in place, “based on clear
factual evidence,” 31 and of the added value of common EU minimum
criminal law standards,32 taking into account the principles of necessity,
proportionality,33 and subsidiarity. In this Communication, market abuse is
the first policy area cited amongst those for which EU criminal law is
desirable. Once the need for criminal law is established, the next step
29. TFEU supra 19, art. 83(2).
30. Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13, at 6.
31. See id. at 8.
To establish the necessity for minimum rules on criminal law, the EU institutions need
to be able to rely on clear factual evidence about the nature or effects of the crime in
question and about a diverging legal situation in all Member States which could
jeopardise the effective enforcement of an EU policy subject to harmonisation. This is
why the EU needs to have at its disposal statistical data from the national authorities
that allow it to assess the factual situation. As part of its follow up action, the
Commission will develop plans to collect further statistical data and evidence to deal
with the areas covered by Article 325(4) and Article 83(2).
Id.
32. See id. at 3.
33. The Institutions have to establish a test to determine whether criminal law measures are
“essential” to achieve the goal of an effective policy implementation. This requires the legislators
to first analyze whether any other measures, besides criminal implications, would sufficiently
ensure the policy implementation or if criminal law could more effectively address the problem.
See id. at 7. Moreover, the condition of necessity requires deciding which criminal law measures
to include in a particular legislative instrument. Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
(“[t]he severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offense”) applies here.
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 49(3), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 20. See
also Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13, at 8; MARCUS-SILVERSTOR GROENHUIJSEN
& JANNEMIEKE OUWERKERK, Ultima ration en criteria voor strafbaarstelling in Europees
perspectief, in ROOSACHTIG STRAFRECHT. LIBER AMICORUM THEO DE ROOS 258 (M.
Groenhuijsen, T. Kooijmans & J. Ouwerkerk eds., 2013).
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concerns the determination of the concrete criminal measure to be adopted
at the EU level.
Under Article 83 of the Treaty, EU legislation is limited to “minimum”
rules on criminal law.34 Consequently, a full harmonization is impossible.
Moreover, Article 83(2) TFEU mentions that the objective to reach is an
“approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States,”
meaning a reduction of the variation degree between the national systems.35
Nevertheless, according to the principles of legal certainty and
proportionality, it is important to clearly define what conduct may be
considered criminal, as well as the result to be achieved through the
implementation of EU legislation.
The concept of “minimum” rules should be clarified36 to avoid any
ambiguity. Regarding sanctions, EU criminal law can require Member
States to enact effective, proportionate, and deterrent criminal sanctions for
a specific conduct. The Commission’s interpretation of “minimum rules” is
clear: several documents specify that “EU law sometimes specifically
determines which types and/or levels of criminal sanctions are to be made
applicable.” 37 The Commission also states that “in each case, the EU
34. Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13.
35. Id. at 6.
36. SeeMIETTINEN, supra note 25, at 44.
The choice of instruments and their inherent limits will also remain a point of
contention. Express provisions on approximation refer to directives as the legal
instrument by which the Union may create minimum rules. Given substantial
limitations to the directive as an instrument, and to the potential lack of direct effect to
instruments containing minimum rules, the question arises whether any provisions on
the new Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) may allow directly applicable
rules on criminal law to be created in the form of Regulation, or whether either these or
other competences ostensibly outside the AFSJ can be exercised to circumvent AFSJ
references to directives. If the narrative on the development of EU criminal
competences can be seen as a contest between the centralizing effects of EU law and
the desire of the Member States to retain criminal law as a relatively decentralized
policy area, then Lisbon has changed the rules but has not ended the game. What, for
example, are “minimum rules?”.
Id.
37. The possibility to make a proposal in the field of criminal law including type and level of
criminal sanctions included in the EU directive appears in Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra
note 13, at 8–9: “Regarding sanctions, ‘minimum rules’ can be requirements of certain sanction
types (e.g. fines, imprisonment, disqualification), levels or the EU-wide definition of what are to
be considered aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” See Communication of the Commission
on Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial Services Sector, at 14, COM (2010) 716
final (Dec. 8, 2010): “Any proposals in the field of criminal law should aim at ensuring
appropriate coherence and consistency across different sectors, in particular when considering the
type and level of criminal sanctions included in EU directives.” The European Commission page
dedicated to the criminal law policy also specifies that “[t]he EU can adopt directives providing
for minimum rules regarding the definitions of criminal offences, i.e. rules setting out which
behavior is considered to constitute a criminal act and which type and level of sanctions are
applicable for such acts.” Criminal Law Policy, EUR. COMM'N
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/ (last visited Jul. 21, 2014).
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instrument may only set out which sanctions have to be made ‘at least’
available to the judges in each Member State.”38
B. HARMONIZATION OF EU INSIDER TRADING LAW
The European Community was created after the Second World War to
ensure integration and cooperation among Member States with the purpose
of establishing peace and stability.39
The EU aims at creating a single common market through
harmonization towards an ideal of federation. 40 Nevertheless, political and
cultural differences persist. Moreover, Member States are usually skeptical
about giving total control to a central body. Consequently, the EU usually
uses flexible legal instruments, only binding in relation to the “result that is
to be achieved”41: directives.42 National regulators can thereby keep control
over implementation. Prior to adopting the Directive on criminal sanctions
for market abuse, the existing EU legislation concerning market abuse was
restricted to administrative sanctions and measures. Member States enjoyed
considerable autonomy in terms of choice and application of national
sanctions.
The harmonization of European Union securities regulation started in
the 1980s with a legislative framework for common market exchanges,43
introducing a model of mutual recognition and minimum harmonization
aimed at consolidating the internal market and opening the European
market for investments. Amongst these measures, the 1989 Insider Dealing
Directive was the first to prohibit insider trading at EU level. 44
38. Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13, at 8.
39. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 7 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 5th ed. 2008).
40. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 11, art. 2.
41. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 249.
42. See Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial Services Sector, supra note 37. Prior
to the MAD’s reforms, the European directives and regulations in place in the area of financial
law dealt with four principal issues: (1) “coordination of the power to impose sanctions between
several Member States”; (2) “obligation for Member States to provide for the application of
appropriate administrative sanctions and measures and ensure that they are effective,
proportionate, and dissuasive”; (3) “sanctions for specific infringements”; and (4) “provision for
the authorities to publish the measures and sanctions under certain circumstances.” Id. at 5–6
(underlining omitted).
43. See generally Council Directive 79/279/EEC, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21; Council Directive
80/390/EEC, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1; Council Directive 82/121/EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 66) 21; Council
Directive 88/627/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 1; Council Directive 2011/34/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 1;
Completing the Internal Market, COM (1985) 310 final (June 6, 1985); Single European Act,
1987 O.J. (L 169) 1; the Communication of the Commission Towards a Single Market Act, COM
(2010) 608 final/2 (Nov. 11, 2011); Council Directive 85/611/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3; Council
Directive 89/298/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 1; Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1.
44. Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30 (EC).
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In 1999, the Commission adopted the Financial Action Service Plan
(FASP).45 The idea of this plan was to promulgate 42 legislative measures,
among which was the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). Ultimately, the
MAD was enacted in 2003.46 A few years later, after the adoption of the
FSAP, the so-called Lamfalussy process47 provided a new first level general
legislative framework for European financial markets, complemented by a
series of more detailed second level legislative measures, 48 providing
technical details relative to the Market Abuse Directive.49 The European
Securities Committee (ESC)50 and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR)51 were also created.
Adopted in early 2003, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC
introduced a comprehensive framework to tackle insider dealing and market
manipulation practices. In order to ensure the enforcement of Directive
2003/6/EC, Member States were required to implement appropriate
administrative measures and sanctions. This requirement did not imply any
consequences on Member States’ criminal dispositions.
Nevertheless, according to the Commission, this system did not achieve
the effective protection of the financial markets52 as desired. In December
45. Financial S€rvices: Implementing the Framework For Financial Markets: Action Plan,
COM (1999) 232 (May 11, 1999).
46. Council Directive 2003/6, On Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse),
2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.
47. The reference to the Lamfalussy Process pays tribute to the Final Report of the Committee
of Wise Men On The Regulation of European Securities Markets, which, under the chairmanship
of Alexandre Lamfalussy, provided recommendations on the future regulation of European
securities markets. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-
men_en.pdf.
48. Resolution of the European Council on More Effective Securities Market Regulation in the
European Union, 2001 O.J. (C 138) 1.
49. Commission Directive 2003/124, Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Definition and Public Disclosure of Inside
Information and the Definition of Market Manipulation of Dec. 22, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 339) 70;
Commission Directive 2003/125/EC, Implementing Directive 2003/6 of the European Parliament
and of the Council as Regards the Fair Presentation of Investment Recommendations and the
Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest of Dec 22, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 339) 73; Commission Directive
2004/72, Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as
Regards Accepted Market Practices, the Definition of Inside Information in Relation to
Derivatives on Commodities, the Drawing Up of Lists of Insiders, the Notification of Managers’
Transactions and the Notification of Suspicious Transactions of Apr. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 162)
70; Commission Regulation 2273/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 336) 33.
50. Commission Decision Establishing the European Securities Committee (ESC), COM
(2001) 1493 (Jun. 6, 2001). The ESC is constituted of officials of Member States’ governments
and Commission officials.
51. Commission Decision Establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR), COM (2001) 1501 (Jun. 6, 2001). The CESR is constituted of representatives of Member
States’ national regulators and Commission representatives.
52. Proposal for Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market
Manipulation, at 3, COM (2011) 654 (Oct. 20, 2011).
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2010, the European Commission issued a communication on “Reinforcing
sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector.”53
ESMA replaced the Committee of European Securities Regulation on
January 1, 2011. ESMA’s work on securities legislation aims at
contributing to the development of a single European rulebook by
improving coordination and cooperation amongst securities regulators, as
well as acting as an advisory group to the European Union Commission.
ESMA is also in charge of issuing guidance on the common operation of
the Market Abuse Directive.
C. DIRECTIVE ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR MARKET ABUSE
The first aspect of the reform of the legislative framework for market
abuse regulation at EU level consists of a Regulation,54 which basically
replaces the MAD and incorporates major elements of the Directives. This
Regulation implies modifications to the prohibition, to the supervisory55 and
enforcement powers, 56 as well as to the administrative measures and
sanctions 57 directly applicable by the Member States. The Commission
justified this choice with the fact that a Regulation is the most appropriate
legal instrument to define the market abuse framework within the Union
because it actually reduces the regulatory complexity related to the diversity
of legislation across the Union. Indeed, it would offer greater legal certainty
for those subject to the legislation across the Union, introducing a
harmonized set of core rules, thereby contributing to the functioning of the
Single Market.58
Secondly, the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse was
adopted on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU.59 The motivation is that today,
Member States use divergent criminal measures to enforce the prohibition
of insider trading. The Commission argues that this may provide incentives
53. Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial Services Sector, supra note 37.
54. Regulation 596/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on
Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and Repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and
2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1 [hereinafter Regulation 596/2014].
55. Mathias Siems & Matthijs Nelemans, The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law:
Revolution or Evolution?, 19 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 195, 205 (2012).
56. See Regulation 596/2014, supra note 54, arts. 25–26. Cross-border cooperation will be
reinforced.
57. Id. art. 23; id. art. 30 (“(h) maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least three
times the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement, where those
can be determined . . . (i) in respect of a natural person, maximum administrative pecuniary
sanctions of at least . . . EUR 5,000,000 . . . (j) in respect of legal persons, maximum
administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least . . . EUR 15,000,000 or 15 % of the total annual
turnover of the legal person according to the last available accounts approved by the management
body . . .”).
58. Id. pmbl. art. 23.
59. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5.
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for persons to carry out insider trading in those Member States that provide
weak measures for this offense.60
This Directive is in line with the policy of the Commission to
increasingly introduce common EU minimum criminal law standards,
arguing that only criminal law can demonstrate social disapproval of a
qualitatively different nature compared to administrative sanctions or
compensation mechanisms under civil law.61
Because the Commission can only address criminal matters by the way
of directives, it produced a Directive that only addresses approximation in
insider trading criminal matters and general minimum rules.
The Directive requires Member States:
- “[to] take the necessary measures to ensure that insider dealing . . .
constitute[s] a criminal offence . . .” 62 “when committed
intentionally [Art. 3]”,63
- “[to] take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences are
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal
sanctions [Art. 7]”,64
- “to ensure that [insider trading] is punishable by a maximum term
of imprisonment of at least four years [Art. 7]”,65
- “to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for [criminal insider
trading] [Art. 8]”.66
Moreover, Article 12 of the Directive holds that by July 4, 2018 the
Commission should provide a report to the European Parliament and the
Council on the application of the Directive and, if necessary, on the need to
amend it, in particular with regard to the appropriateness of introducing
common minimum rules on types and levels of criminal sanctions. The
Commission hence explicitly wishes to reserve the right to introduce
common minimum rules on the types and level of criminal sanctions based
on Article 83(2) TFEU.67
60. Id. pmbl. recital 7.
61. On the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, supra note 2, pmbl.
62. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, art. 3(1). See also ESMA, supra
note 8, at 73. This is not the case in one country: Bulgaria.
63. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, art. 3(1). See also ESMA, supra
note 8, at 112. Proof of intent is not required in order to have a guilty verdict in a market abuse
case in Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.
64. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, art. 7(1).
65. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, art. 7(2). See also ESMA, supra
note 8, at 105. The maximum length of imprisonment for insider dealing violations is less than
four years in Belgium, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Estonia and Hungary.
66. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, art. 8(1). See also ESMA, supra
note 8, at 73. “Market abuse can not give rise to criminal sanctions in Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden.
67. See Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13. According to the Communication of
the European Commission, minimum rules for the definition of sanctions “rules out a full
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The next portion of this Article focuses on the Directive on criminal
sanctions for market abuse. The Directive raises two issues that seem
separate, but merge within the purview of the Directive. On the one hand,
the question arises whether insider trading should be criminalized, but on
the other hand, if one has decided that there should be a role for criminal
law one must consider if criminal law should be mandated at EU level.
II. CRIMINALIZATION OF INSIDER TRADING: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE
This section provides a law and economics perspective of whether
insider trading should be criminalized. In order to answer that question, the
first subsection analyzes under which circumstances public or private
enforcement would lead to more cost-effective insider trading laws
enforcement. Then, assuming that public enforcement of insider trading
laws may be necessary, whether optimal sanctions should be monetary or
non-monetary or if public enforcement should take the form of
administrative or criminal law enforcement is considered. Criminalization
implies particular criteria. The next subsection applies these economic
criteria to insider trading and argues that criminal role should only play a
role in very specific circumstances and more attention should be paid to
alternative legal tools. Both from an economic and a legal perspective,
criminal law should be considered as a last resort remedy (ultimum
remedium), based on the fact that the costs of applying criminal law are
very high and that criminal law infringes most strongly on human rights and
individual civil liberties.
A. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION
The rationale for public enforcement of insider trading law relates to the
question of why society cannot rely exclusively on private enforcement of
laws to control undesirable insider behavior. This subsection explores the
economic criteria under which the use of public law enforcement should be
preferred over private enforcement.
Because of the relative costs of enforcement, private enforcement
should be preferred to public enforcement from an economic perspective, as
long as it is less costly and it can provide an equivalent deterrence effect.68
Moreover, Gary Becker’s classic model of optimal enforcement establishes
harmonisation” but “minimum rules can be requirements of certain sanction types (e.g. fines,
imprisonment, disqualification).” Id. at 7–8.
68. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357,
363–64 (1984). See also Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J. L. &
ECON. 255, 273 (1993); Roger J. Van den Bergh & Louis T. Visscher, Optimal Enforcement of
Safety Law, in MITIGATING RISK IN THE CONTEXT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY: HOW RELEVANT IS
A RATIONALAPPROACH? 29 (Richard D. de Mulder ed., 2008)
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that when the probability of detection is low or when the gain or the harm is
high, more severe sanctions are needed in order to compensate and attain
optimal deterrence.69
In the trade-off between private and public enforcement, the most
important criterion is whether potential victims will have sufficient
incentives to file a lawsuit under private law. There could be many reasons
why victims could suffer substantial damage but nevertheless never bring
suit, even in insider trading cases. The most frequent reason is that their
losses are often dispersed. They may, therefore, suffer from what is known
as a rational apathy or a rational disinterest problem: since their losses
appear to be very small, they are rationally disinterested in bringing suit.70
The other major problem with private law enforcement is related to the
fact that probability of detection can be low. It is well known that if the
probability of bringing a lawsuit is less than 100%, the sanction for
deterring a potential insider should be correspondingly higher. In that case,
public enforcement is called for to outweigh the low detection rate.71 It is
potentially possible to remedy the low probability of detection by
increasing the amount of compensation payable by the injurer under tort
law. This is precisely the idea behind the concept of punitive damages.72
Also, the rational apathy problem created by the potentially widespread
nature of damages could be resolved by allowing collective action by
victims.73
Hence, private litigation of insider trading may constitute a problem
because of rational apathy and low probability of detection. However, it is
possible to resolve these problems with punitive damages, 74 collective
69. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 210 (2009).
70. Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation: The Incentives for
Class Actions and Legal Actions Taken by Associations, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 184, 185–86 (2000).
See also ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, Should Consumer Protection Law Be Publicly Enforced? An
Economic Perspective on EC Regulation 2006/2004 and its Implementation in the Consumer
Protection Laws of the Member States, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW:
SECURING COMPLIANCE IN EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATEGROUP ACTION AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY
INTERVENTION 179–203 (William Van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 2007); Goran Skogh & Charles
Stuart, An Economic Analysis of Crime Rates, Punishment and the Social Consequences of Crime,
38 PUBLIC CHOICE 171, 178 (1982).
71. See Goran Skogh, A Note on Gary Becker’s Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 75 SWEDISH J. ECON. 305, 309 (1973).
72. William Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 128, 135 (1981). See generally Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982).
73. See SONJA KESKE, ANDREA RENDA, & ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, Financing and Group
Litigation, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL, EMPIRICAL
AND ECONOMICANALYSIS (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010).
74. LOTTE MEURKENS & EMILY NORDIN, THE POWER OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: IS EUROPE
MISSINGOUT? § 101 (Intersentia 2012).
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action,75 and conditional fee arrangements.76 Currently, in most European
legal systems, these tools do not exist or exist only to a limited extent.
Before turning to criminal law, the focus should first fall on the possibilities
to improve the way private enforcement of insider trading law functions.77
From an economic perspective, criminal law, as an instrument of public
enforcement, is only needed when private enforcement fails. In Europe, this
is often the case with insider trading matters for the reasons mentioned
above. On the policy level, it may be more interesting to look at alternative
methods to improve private enforcement functionality, reducing the need
for criminalization of insider trading.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE VERSUS CRIMINAL LAW AND CRITERIA FOR
CRIMINALIZATION
The deterrence theory provides an economic framework for the analysis
of law enforcement: the goal of the law and its enforcement is deterrence,
which should be achieved by setting optimal expected sanctions. Based on
this theoretical framework and the objectives of the law and economics
theory, the regulators’ numerous options to set optimal policies addressing
insider trading regulation are introduced and discussed. The central concern
of this subsection is the sanction, and more precisely, its type, nature, and
form.
1. Optimal expected sanction
First, regarding the optimal expected sanctions, the use of high
sanctions with a low probability of detection may not be optimal
75. There is certainly a debate at the European level about the development of collective
action. See Hans Micklitz & Astrid Stadler, The Development of Collective Legal Action in
Europe, Especially in Germany, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1473 (2006). See also Van den Burgh &
Visscher, supra note 68:
For individual victims these costs are almost by definition insurmountable but
associations might acquire adequate funding for such investigations by charging their
members a membership fee or by means of sponsoring. Thanks to group actions
economies of scale can be achieved . . . After all, the costs of the lawsuit decrease while
the probability of winning the suit (and thereby the expected utility as well) increases if
multiple plaintiffs have larger financial means, enabling them to have better access to
evidence and get better legal advice. The problem of rational apathy is therefore
reduced..
76. MICHAEL FAURE, FOKKE FERNHOUT & NIELS PHILIPSEN, No Cure, No Pay and
Contingency Fees, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL,
EMPIRICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010).
77. Decriminalization is considered important in the relevant literature. See DIRK VAN ZYL
SMIT, HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROMISING PRACTICES ON ALTERNATIVES TO
IMPRISONMENT, 13, U.N. Sales No. E.07.XI.2 (2007). See also J.-M. COULON, La Dépénalisation
de la Vie des Affaires (Ministère de la Justice, France 2008).
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considering the arguments relating to the risks of insolvency,78 the costs of
implementation of a large sanctions, 79 the marginal deterrence, 80 the
importance of the enforceability of laws and the clearance rate,81 and the
supposed risk aversion towards sanctions of the insider traders.82 Moreover,
according to the scholarly literature, risk aversion implies that optimal
sanctions should not be maximal.83
78. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
183–93 (1968). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Trade-Off Between
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 (1979) (“It is frequently
argued that the probability should be as low as possible. The only constraint on lowering the
probability that is recognized is the inability of individuals to pay the fine; thus, the optimal fine
implied by this argument equals an individual’s wealth.”); Nuno Garoupa, Optimal Magnitude
and Probability of Fines, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 1765, 1766 (2001) (“The government should set
the fine equal to an offender’s entire wealth and complement it with the appropriate probability in
order to achieve optimal deterrence.”).
79. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
80. This argument is related to the necessity of proportionality. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE UTILITARIANS 171 (Anchor Books, 1973).
Bentham emphasized that the goal of a sanction is “to induce a man to choose always the least
mischievous of two offenses; therefore where two offenses come in competition, the punishment
for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.”
81. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 1, 2–3
(2002).
Theoretically and empirically . . . sometimes no corporate law may be better than a
good corporate law that is not enforced. This is an important issue because a number of
emerging markets have adopted corporate laws, but many of them have not enforced
these laws . . . if a law is enacted but not enforced, only some will follow the law; the
ones who do not follow the law will deviate with greater intensity in equilibrium,
thereby causing law abiders more harm than they were incurring when there was no
law. We next ask whether insider trading laws satisfy the above conditions. Our answer
is sometimes they do. This happens when corporate insiders have very imperfect
information, if the cost of acquiring perfect information is not too high nor too low, and
if there are many who will not follow the insider trading law if the insider trading law is
not enforced.
See also Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Law Work?, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT.267, 310 (2005).
It is worse to have a regulation that fails to prosecute those who violate it (Mexico,
Norway, Russia), than no law at all. The legal reform in countries that have started it—
especially in Eastern European countries—should definitely take into account that laws
that are not accompanied by good enforcement are useless at best.
82. Elizabeth Szockyj & Gilbert Geis, Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, 30 J. CRIM.
JUST. 277, 283 (2002); Nancy Reichman, Regulating Risky Business: Dilemmas in Security
Regulation, 13 L. & POL’Y 263, 294 (1991). Reichman holds that insiders belong to the highly
skilled category of individuals capable of minimizing risks and increasing the certainty of
profitable outcomes. KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM.BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A
STUDY 126–7 (Yale Univ. Press. 1977).
83. According to Polinsky and Shavell, risk aversion implies that optimal sanctions should not
be maximal. See ANTHONY M. POLINSKY & STEVEN SHAVELL, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 415 (Elsevier 1st ed. 2007).
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2. Monetary and non-monetary sanctions
Regarding the trade-off between monetary and non-monetary sanctions,
the major observations of the literature are as follows: society cannot
exclusively rely on monetary sanctions, 84 and, furthermore, there are
circumstances under which the use of non-monetary sanctions is necessary
to operate either deterrence or incapacitation.
An individual’s wealth or occupation can have an impact on the
necessity of the use of non-monetary sanctions for deterrence. The literature
raises three specific points regarding this issue. First, the deterrence effect
of monetary sanctions is limited by wealth, and thus, non-monetary
sanctions should be used as a complement to monetary fines.85 Second,
risk-seeking attitudes increase with wealth; wealthy individuals should
therefore not be imposed with maximum monetary sanctions. 86 Third,
shorter prison terms should be imposed with higher opportunity costs for
their time.87
Furthermore, non-monetary sanctions should be used for incapacitation
under restricted circumstances and should be calibrated to the social or
economic threat of the offender.88
From an economic perspective, an optimal law enforcement policy
should be achieved by first, using maximum monetary sanctions as well as
84. Roger Bowles, Michael Faure & Nuno Garoupa, Economic Analysis of the Removal of
Illegal Gains, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 537, 538 (2000). See also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law
and the Optimal Use of Non Monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COL. L. REV. 1233, 1237
(1985). “If the likelihood of failure to deter undesirable acts, together with the expected harm in
which the acts would result, is sufficiently high, then resort to nonmonetary sanctions may be
desirable despite the greater social costs attending their use.” Id.
85. Literature discusses how the appreciation of monetary sanctions’ deterrence effect is
relative to and limited by the personal level of assets or wealth, due to the fact that a monetary
sanction is a transfer of wealth. See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White Collar
Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980). See also Shavell, supra note 84 at 1236 (“Since
non-monetary sanctions are socially more costly to impose than monetary sanctions . . . it is easy
to say where nonmonetary sanctions should be employed . . . Social welfare will be greater if only
the less costly monetary sanctions are used to deter undesirable acts.”); Roger Bowles, Michael
Faure & Nuno Garoupa,, The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View
and Policy Implications, 35 J. L.& SOC’Y 389, 405 (2008); SHAVELL, supra note 79 (presenting
the non-monetary sanction as a solution to operate deterrence on “poor” people).
86. Polinsky and Shavell established that the low-wealth-type of individuals should face
maximum monetary sanctions equivalent to their wealth, whilst high-wealth-type of individuals
should not be imposed with maximal monetary sanctions, because this may lead to over-
deterrence. See Anthony M. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth
Varies Among Individuals, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618, 619 (1991).
87. A sophisticated analysis reveals how opportunity cost of time is a parameter influencing
the appreciation of socially incapacitating sanctions. Indeed, Chu and Jiang consider that the
burden of imprisonment falls more heavily on individuals with higher opportunity cost of time.
See Cyrus Chu & Neville Jiang, Are Fines More Efficient Than Imprisonment?, 51 J. PUB. ECON.
391, 405 (1993).
88. See VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 77; GUILLAUME ROYER, L’EFFICIENCE EN DROIT PENAL
ECONOMIQUE—ETUDE DUDROIT POSITIF A LA LUMIERE DE L’ANALYSE ECONOMIQUE DUDROIT
143 (2009).
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proportional and wealth-related ones, and second, by complementing them
with non-monetary sanctions, 89 starting with the less costly ones
(considering control, infrastructure, maintenance, and indirect and
consequential costs) and the less restrictive ones, in order to induce a
similar deterrent effect. From a theoretical point of view, to achieve an
equal deterrence effect, non-incapacitating, non-monetary sanctions should
be used first (naming and shaming sanctions should be dealt with carefully
because of the irreversible stigma they impose and their error costs and
potential disproportionate consequences),90 followed by the economically
incapacitating ones (status ban penalty, withdrawal of licenses,
disqualification of managers) and lastly, by the socially incapacitating
ones.91 Economic incapacitation should be applied to social harm (societal
threats), whilst social incapacitation should be applied to economic harm
(market-specific danger).92 Incarceration should always be the last resort,
meaning that it should be based on the conclusion that other sanctions are
insufficient. All the other means have to be explored and tried first.
3. Administrative and criminal sanctions
Together, the concepts surrounding sanctions 93 and the ultima ratio
principle explain the subsidiary role of criminal law.94 When criminalizing,
89. Bowles, Faure, & Garoupa, supra note 84. See Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Non
Monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 584 (1987); Steven Shavell & A.
Mitchell Polinsky, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984);
BECKER, supra note 78, at 208:
Offenders who cannot pay fines have to be punished in other ways . . . . Fines have
several advantages over other punishments: for example, they conserve resources,
compensate society as well as punish offenders, and simplify the determination of
optimal p’s and f’s. Not surprisingly, fines are the most common punishment and have
grown in importance over time.
See also Shavell, supra note 84, at 1236–37. “[N]onmonetary sanctions should be employed only
when monetary sanctions cannot adequately deter undesirable acts . . . .”.
90. Jan Van Erp, Naming Without Shaming: The Publication of Sanctions in the Dutch
Financial Market, 5 REG. & GOVERNANCE 287, 292 (2011) (maintaining that naming offenders
functions as a general deterrent in the market for financial intermediaries, but considerably less so
in the capital market: “An undesired, but perhaps more likely potential effect is that the
publication of sanctions is experienced as stigmatizing. In that case, naming offenders results in
defiance, disengagement, distrust, and, expectedly, more crime”). See Note, Shame, Stigma, and
Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions and Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186
(2003). There is danger of overdeterrence and disproportional sanctions when stigmatisation is
used as the goal of criminal law. See Alon Klement & Alon Harel, The Economics of Stigma: Why
More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007).
91. By socially incapacitating sanction, we refer primarily to imprisonment.
92. See ROYER, supra note 88.
93. CESARE PEDRAZZI, Le Rôle Sanctionnateur du Droit Pénal, in LE ROLE
SANCTIONNATEUR DU DROIT PENAL (1985); N. EL-DIN HINDAWI, ESSAI D’UNE THEORIE
GENERALE DE LA JUSTIFICATION (1979).
94. For an explanation of the sanctioning function of criminal law, see K. BINDING, DIE
NORMEN UND IHRE UBERTRETUNG: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG UBER DIE RECHTMASSIGE
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the ultima ratio principle, the principle of legitimate purpose, the principle
of guilt, and the principle of legality should always be carefully considered.
From an economic point of view, in the trade-off between
administrative and criminal enforcement, all things being equal,
administrative procedure has the advantage of being less costly than
criminal procedure.95 However, there are clear economic reasons that prove
society cannot rely exclusively on administrative law. The use of criminal
law seems justified when there is a need for very stringent sanctions and
accurate proceedings in order to secure the imposition of such stringent
sanctions (reduction of error cost).96 Particularly, the use of the most severe
sanctions through criminal law is desirable to effectuate deterrence when
the gain or the harm is very high, and when the probability of detection and
conviction is very low. They may also be needed to effectuate
incapacitation in cases of limited wealth, violence, or undeterrability.97 The
most severe sanctions should be imposed through criminal proceedings
because criminal procedure offers the advantage of securing the imposition
of such severe sanctions through high procedural requirements, which
guarantee limited error costs.98 Moreover, the inherent stigma associated
with criminal law enables the strengthening of the deterrence effect of any
criminal sanction. Nevertheless, it may not always be optimal to have a
systematic recourse to criminal law when a high sanction is sought. It may
be relevant to keep in mind that, even if criminal law seems to offer the
most coercive sanctions through social incapacitation and inherent stigma,
some sanctions, such as “naming and shaming” sanctions or classic fines
with an added dimension of shame, can be considered as serious
alternatives. Moreover, and as extensively described above, criminal law
achieves a very specific goal and should be reserved for harms fulfilling
specific criteria. Consequently, the recourse to such enforcement should be
considered very cautiously and not be solely based on the belief that it is
actually the most coercive measure.
HANDLUNG UND DIE ARTEN DES DELIKTS (Aalen: Scientia. 1965); R. GARRAUD, TRAITE
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU DROIT PENAL FRANÇAIS (Recueil Sirey 3d ed. 1913); L. JIMÉNEZ
DEASUA, DERECHO PENAL § t.I, n°8, par.13, in fine (1917).
95. See Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & Niels Philipsen, Curbing Consumer Financial
Losses: The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, 31 L. & POL’Y 161,173–76 (2009).
96. See Thomas Miceli, Optimal Prosecution of Defendents Whose Guilt is Uncertain, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 189 (1990).
97. See BECKER, supra note 78; Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); BOWLES, supra note
85; L. ESCRESA GUILLERMO, REEXAMINING THE ROLE OF INCARCERATION AND STIGMA IN
CRIMINAL LAW (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 2011); Shavell, supra note 84; Steven Shavell,
A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 2 (1987); ANTHONY POLINSKY,
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 415 (Elsevier 1st ed. 2007); KATARINA SVATIKOVA,
ECONOMIC CRITERIA FOR CRIMINALIZATION (2012).
98. SeeMiceli, supra note 96.
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Finally, regarding the accumulation of administrative and criminal
enforcement of laws, it seems desirable to opt for a non-cumulative system
of prosecutions in order to reduce the risk of over-punishment and the costs
of prosecution.99
In the place of criminal enforcement, administrative enforcement may
be appropriate when the alleged harm is relatively low and the probability
of sanctions relatively high, when the individual has many assets at stake,
when the individual may be better punished by economic incapacitation and
when criminal stigma is not necessary for deterrence.
C. CRIMINALIZATION OF INSIDER TRADING?
The economic criteria for criminalization can apply to insider trading.
First, the question of the need for criminal law comes down to whether
there is a need to use criminal law for deterrence. Therefore, one must
determine whether the potential harm caused by, or the gain obtained via
insider trading, can be high enough and the probability of sanctions low
enough for the optimal administrative sanctions to fail in deterring potential
insiders.
Even though the measure of the impact of insider trading on economic
efficiency is controversial,100 insider trading is considered harmful from
both a moral,101 as well as a fairness and justice102 point of view.
99. Wouter Wils, The Principle of “Ne Bis in Idem” in EC Antitrus Enforcement: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 131, 136 (2003). “From the perspective of
minimizing cost, multiple prosecutions would thus always appear undesirable.” Id. at 137.
100. The empirical literature has tried to measure the insider trading harm or benefits through
the assessment of indirect variables or by evaluating its impact on the economy of insider trading
law. For an assessment of the detrimental effects of insider trading on economic efficiency, see
FRANKH. EASTERBROOK, INSIDER TRADING AS ANAGENCY PROBLEM (John W. Pratt & Richard
J. Zeckhauser eds., Harv. Bus. Press 1985). See also REINIER KRAAKMAN, THE LEGAL THEORY
OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (K. Hopt & E. Wymeersch eds.,
1991); James S. Ang & Don R. Cox, Controlling the Agency Cost of Insider Trading, 10 J. FIN. &
STRATEGIC DECISIONS 1 (1997); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, Corporate Financial
Structure and Managerial Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY
(John J. McCall ed., 1982); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional
Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26
CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993); Laura Beny, A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and
Market Theories of Insider Trading, (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 264 (1999));
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 81. For a discussion on the economic efficiency of insider
trading, see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857 (1983). See also HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(The Free Press 1966).
101. Roy A. Scotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, 53 VA. L. REV. 7 (1967).
102. ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORMS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 46 (Clarendon
Press. 1994) (“Regulation may be inspired by a desire, which is quite distinct from efficiency
aims, to achieve ‘fair’ or ‘just’ distribution of resources”.). For the concepts of “fairness” and
“justice”, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in MODERN MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(1998); DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING
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The median insider trading gain or loss avoided appears to be stable
through the decades, reaching approximately $25,594.103 Obviously, there
are cases where gains are substantially lower or substantially higher in other
cases. This means that, in many cases, administrative sanctions may suffice
to achieve deterrence. However, an analysis by Frino, et al. establishes that
the average insider trading gain or loss avoided is $215,696.104 This would
suggest that some insiders obtain astronomical gains; these are the cases
that justify the use of criminal law.
The literature on detection highlights several challenges in detecting
insider trading. Even if the scholars have not yet been able to measure the
quantity of undetected insider trading, several studies suggest that insider
trading is a common practice that remains rarely detected mainly because of
its immaterial105 and diffuse106 nature. Hence, the essence of insider trading
is based on legitimately acquired but confidential information that one
receives from a personal position.107 Moreover, financial instruments and
trades are considered to be international, anonymous, technical, and
immaterial. 108 Insiders may also hide their trades using proxies or
intermediaries. 109 Finally, the scholarly literature questions the limited
THE PRINCIPLES OFMORALS (Lewis Amherst & Selby-Bigge eds., Clarendon Press 1902) (1777);
IMMANUELKANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2010).
103. Alex Frino et al., How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade?, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. 241, 249
(2013). See also Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN.
1661, 1666 (1992); Szockyj & Geis, supra note 82.
104. See Frino, supra note 103, at 249. The mean value was reached from a sample of 296
illegal insider trades.
105. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY 5 (AEI
Press. 1991) (“In addition, detecting insider trading is difficult. For one thing, insiders can
disguise their identities and trade through proxies and foreign intermediaries.”). See also
EASTERBROOK, supra note 100, at 91; THOMAS MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW
(Stanford Univ. Press. 2004).
106. For instance, when an insider buys stocks or when informed insiders trade on inside
information, any uninformed investor trading against them will lose in the transaction. See Joseph
E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141, 1146 (1976); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special
Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. BUS. 410, 414 (1974); Michael S. Rozeff & Mir A. Zaman,
Market Efficiency and Insider Trading: New Evidence, 61 J. BUS. 25, 25 (1988); H. Nejat Seyhun,
The Effectiveness of Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON. 148, 149–48 (1992); Esther B.
DelBrio, Alberto Miguel & Javier Perote, An Investigation of Insider Trading Profits in the
Spanish Stock Market, 42 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 73, 75 (2002) (discussing the effects in Spain);
Josef Lakonishok & Inmoo Lee, Are Insider Trades Informative?, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 79, 80
(2001) (discussing the effects in the United States); Jerome B. Baesel & Garry R. Stein, The Value
of Information: Inferences from the Profitability of Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 553, 567 (1979) (discussing the effects in Canada); Sylvain Friederich et al., Detecting
Returns Around the Trades of Corporate Insiders in the London Stock Exchange, 8 EUR. FIN.
MGMT. 7, 26 (2002) (discussing the effects in the United Kingdom); P. F. Pope, R. C. Morris, &
D. A. Peel, Insider Trading: Some Evidence on Market Efficiency and Directors Share Dealings
in Great Britain, 17 J. BUS., FIN. & ACCT. 359, 378 (1990) (discussing the effects in the United
Kingdom).
107. See Szockyj & Geis, supra note 82, at 283.
108. See EASTERBROOK, supra note 100; Miceli, supra note 96.
109. See KRAAKMAN, supra note 100; MACEY, supra note 105.
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efficacy of the methods of detection used by the public authorities110 and
the insufficiency of staff and budget resources dedicated to insider trading
detection.111 They also suggest that a large number of insider trading cases
remain undetected.112 All in all, the literature provides elements that support
the idea that insider trading is difficult to detect.
Insider trading involves the trading on the basis of material non-public
information. The establishment of the material and the non-public qualities
of the information on which the trade is based are central to successfully
prosecuting and convicting illegal insider trading. Under certain
circumstances, the intention of the insider also has to be proven.113 This
process is difficult, if not “impossible.” 114 Most of the time, the
establishment of a certain level of culpability is only required under
criminal law. The establishment of any level of guilt proves to be extremely
difficult in insider trading matters due to the nature of the crime. Finally, an
ESMA report has established that the probability of conviction of insider
trading is 52.3% for administrative insider trading and 37.3% for criminal
insider trading.115
It has been established that insider trading can prove to be unfair and,
more controversially, potentially harmful for the economy. Moreover, the
gain or loss avoided from insider trading can be substantial. Furthermore,
the probability of sanctions (resulting from the combination of the
probability of detection and conviction) tends to be quite low. Under these
circumstances, criminal law would be needed for deterrence.
Another consideration should be the stigma associated with criminal
prosecutions. Although it is doubtful whether inflicting a stigma is a good
criterion for criminalization, some literature suggests that first time
offenders would particularly suffer social and economic consequences from
being criminally convicted. 116 Furthermore, the literature indicates that
insiders mostly belong to the category of wrongdoers who are especially
receptive to stigma.117 On the one hand, this may be an argument to use
criminal law for its stigmatizing effect; on the other hand, the potential
110. See Frino, supra note 103; LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTICIONERS (Oxford Univ. Press 2003); Meulbroek, supra note 103.
111. Laura Beny & Nejat Seyhun, Has Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United
States? Evidence from Takeovers (University of Michigan Law School Law and Economics
Research Paper Series, Paper 50, (2012)).
112. Meulbroek, supra note 103.
113. HARRIS, supra note 110, at 588.
114. Id. Larry Harris was former Chief Economist at the SEC from July, 2002 to June, 2004.
115. See ESMA, supra note 8, at 83–84.
116. See J. Adam, Peter-Jan Engelen, & Marc Van Essen, Reputational Penalties on Financial
Markets to Induce Corporate Responsibility, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN TIMES OF TURMOIL
(S. Signori & H. Schäfer eds., 2011). See also Van Erp, supra note 90.
117. See Szockyj & Geis, supra note 82, at 277 (“Frequency of insider trading refers to the
number of times that non-public information was exploited. Two-thirds (67.5 percent) of the
defendants were charged with illegally trading on only one occasion.”).
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dangers of criminal prosecution (de-socialization and over-deterrence
resulting from stigmatizing effects of criminal law)118 have to be seriously
taken into account. As a result, it is doubtful that criminalization would be
warranted for the stigma associated with it. This characteristic could
nevertheless constitute an argument to consider the possibility of
criminalization when it is really needed.
Second, insider trading is not a violent crime for which the use of non-
monetary sanctions would effectuate social incapacitation. Indeed, statistics
indicate that 67.5% of defendants in insider trading cases were only charged
on one occasion. 119 This means that they are not undeterrable repeat
offenders that need to be incarcerated for the purpose of deterrence.
Consequently, critics maintain that social incapacitation may not be
necessary in the context of financial infractions120 and that status sanctions
are “sufficient” according to the law and economics precepts of
deterrence.121 In this respect, non-monetary sanctions as an alternative to
social incapacitation in general, and to incarceration more particularly,
should be favored when dealing with insider trading.
D. ULTIMUMREMEDIUM
Criminal law must be considered in all circumstances as an ultimum
remedium, a remedy of last resort.122 Criminal sanctions not only have high
social costs, but also have very high standards of proof and “enforcement
costs.” 123 Criminal law should only be employed when other remedies
118. See Shame, Stigma and Crime, supra note 90. There is a danger of disproportion when
stigmatisation is used as the goal of criminal law.
119. See Szockyj & Geis, supra note 82, at 277.
120. See Posner, supra note 85, at 418. “But wherever and for whatever reason it is decided to
retain criminal sanctions for individual white-collar offenders, the movement should be toward the
abolition of imprisonment and the substitution of fines—albeit fines more severe than those today
meted out to such offenders.”
121. ROYER, supra note 88, at 143.
122. For the ultima ratio principle notion, see G. STEFANI, QUELQUES ASPECTS DE
L’AUTONOMIE DUDROIT PENAL (1956); R. MERLE& A. VITU, Problème Généraux de la Science
Criminelle, Droit Pénal Général, in TRAITÉ DE DROIT CRIMINAL (1997); N. JAREBORG, What
Kind of Criminal Law Do We Want?, in BEWARE OF PUNISHMENT: ON THE UTILITY AND
FUTILITY OF CRIMINAL LAW 17–22 (A. Snare ed., 1995) (“Punishment is society’s most intrusive
and degrading sanction. Criminalization should accordingly be used only as a last resort or for the
most reprehensible types of wrongdoing.”). See also A. P. SIMESTER & G. R. SULLIVAN,
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE (Hart Publishing 1999) (“Criminal censures should not
be deployed merely as a tool of convenience, and where possible other forms of social control
ought to be used in their stead.”); Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 207 (2004).
123. Criminal law is associated with the highest enforcement costs. See SHAVELL, supra note
79. The different stages of criminal prosecution include investigation, interrogation, collection of
evidence, and possible detention. The litigation is usually longer than for an administrative
enforcement. The people involved in the criminal procedure include the Prosecutor, the
investigator, the lawyers, the police, the judge and possibly the center of incarceration staff.
Following the initial criminal proceedings, there may be up to two opportunities for appeal.
Criminal sanctions may imply social incapacitation and therefore be associated with high
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(private law or administrative enforcement) are not capable of achieving the
same goal. For example, it is the possible to use administrative fines for
cases where there is no insolvency risk due to a limitation of wealth (where
the gain is not too high and the probability of detection not too reduced).
Above all, incarceration, the most stringent sanction available to
criminal law, should be the last resort of criminal sanctions. 124 Non-
monetary alternatives to prison should be favored, starting with the non-
incapacitating methods, followed by financially impairing methods, and
socially incapacitating methods. For example, a corporation can prohibit an
offender from serving as a director for a period of time, or an offender’s
license the revocation of a license or the prohibition to exercise a particular
profession.
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF INSIDER TRADING AT EU LEVEL?
If a policymaker were to decide that there should be a (limited) role for
criminal law, one must then decide whether such criminalization should be
promulgated at the EU level. This question must be addressed while
simultaneously considering whether insider trading law should be
harmonized at the EU level.125 The latter issue will not be addressed for the
simple reason that insider trading has been regulated at the EU level.
However, the mere fact that the norm (in this case, the prohibition of insider
trading) has been promulgated at the EU level does not necessarily imply
that the enforcement measures (criminal law) should be prescribed at the
EU level as well. Recently, Josephine van Zeben has rightly indicated that
as far as the allocation of competences within a federal system like the EU
is concerned, one should distinguish between competences for standard-
setting (making the norm) implementation and enforcement. In both cases,
one could make a choice between allocation to the central or the Member
State level based on economic criteria. 126 Ultimately, the question is
whether the mere fact that the norm itself (prohibition of insider trading)
has been promulgated at the EU level should necessarily imply that the
enforcement costs. The cost of criminal law enforcement includes the maintenance of the entire
public system (prison and courts). Furthermore, a stigma effect and a reputational loss are
associated with the punitive dimension of the criminal sanction. Id.
124. See VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 77.
125. A similar problem arises when discussing the desirability of harmonization of procedural
law. This issue is also strongly related to the harmonization of substantive private rules as well.
See LOUISVISSCHER, A LAW AND ECONOMICSVIEW ONHARMONIZATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW
65–91 (X.E. & C.H. Van Rhee Kramer eds., 2012).
126. See JOSEPHINE VAN ZEBEN, COMPETENCE ALLOCATION AND REGULATORY
FUNCTIONING: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN EMISSION TRADING SCHEME (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2014).
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method of enforcement (i.e., use of the criminal law) should be harmonized
as well.127
These questions are addressed by (A) briefly looking at the economic
criteria for centralization, (B) considering the issue from a European legal
perspective, and (C) finally considering a fundamental legal doctrine
argument. However, from the outset it should be stated that it may be
difficult to apply the economic criteria for the simple reason that such
criteria have been developed primarily to examine whether there would be
arguments in favor of centralization of normative legal standards
(prohibition of insider trading), and not for the question of whether
enforcement measures ought to be harmonized as well. In that respect, only
the general need for harmonization of the method of enforcement
(criminalization) is questioned. The economic theoretical framework does
not provide an answer as to whether a specific modality of criminalization
such as the procedural requirement of intent or the criminal liability of legal
person is desirable. However, the legal doctrine provides some relevant
insight to such queries.
A. ECONOMICS OF FEDERALIZATION CRITERIA FOR
CENTRALIZATION OF NORMSETTING
Economics of harmonization provide a relevant framework for
questioning whether harmonization is desirable depending on the
characteristics of a certain domain. The assessment is made on the basis of
three criteria: inter-jurisdictional externalities, jurisdictional competition,
and transaction costs. Analysis of internal markets and benefits of different
perspectives offer interesting complementary arguments.
1. Transboundary externalities
The economic criteria in favor of centralization of powers, as
mentioned, usually relate to the normative legal rules and not to
enforcement issues. Arguments that speak to enforcement issues include the
fear of transboundary externalities, the risk of a race-to-the-bottom, and the
diminution of transaction costs. 128 Interestingly, those arguments are to
some extent also advanced as criteria by criminal lawyers for harmonization
of the criminal law.129 The danger of cross-border crimes is also advanced
127. Recently, Klip rightly contended that at a European level the subsidiarity principle should
also be considered as a criterion for criminalization. See André Klip, European Criminal Policy,
20 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 3, 6 (2012).
128. See Michael Faure, Regulatory Competition vs. Harmonization in EU Environmental Law,
in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
282–86 (D. Geradin & D. Esty eds., 2001).
129. See André Klip, Conditions for a Corpus Iuris Criminalis, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IUS
COMMUNE IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 110–15 (Michael Faure, H. Schneider & J.
Smits eds., 2002).
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by the European Commission in favor of the use of EU common criminal
law to prevent unpunished offences against EU law in certain policy areas
(such as the protection of the environment and finance). 130 This is the
traditional transboundary or inter-jurisdictional externalities argument that
would justify harmonization.
Of course, it is not difficult to make the argument that securities
markets have become increasingly transboundary and even global. The ’80s
and the ’90s have led to the advent of the current global marketplace.
During the ’80s, restrictions on cross-border capital flows were gradually
relaxed within the major industrial countries.131 Internationalization of the
securities markets can be illustrated by the significant increase in securities
transactions that occur across the borders of several countries. Investors
have access to foreign securities and issuers can tap the major stock markets
in the United States or Europe to raise equity capital.132 Indicators showing
the reality of the internationalization of the securities market include cross-
listing of securities, 133 cross-country hedging and portfolio
diversification,134 open national stock market,135 and “passing the book.”136
All of these practices have significantly increased in the past decades.137
130. Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13.
131. See Marc I. Steinberg & Lee Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis
of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207, 208
(1999).
132. LI ZHAO, SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 100 (Univ. of
Glasgow, 2008).
133. Cross-listing means that a company incorporated in one country lists its securities on an
exchange in another country. See Jodi G. Scarlata, Institutional Developments in the Globalization
of Securities and Futures Markets, 74 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 17 (1992), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/01/Developments_Jan_Feb1992.pdf. See also
John Coffee, Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependant Perspective 17 (192
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, 2002) (“[T]he number of foreign companies listed
on the two principal U.S. stock markets (the NYSE and Nasdaq) grew from 170 in 1990 to over
750 in 2000 (or roughly a 450% increase)”); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Daniela
Klingebiel, Stock Markets in Transition Economies, (World Bank Financial Sector Discussion
Paper No. 5, 2000).
134. Cross-national portfolio investment is the degree to which investors of a country buy
securities listed in another country. See Scarlata, supra note 132, at 18 (“A U.S. trader, for
example, can diversify a portfolio composed of U.S. stocks by buying stocks of a U.K. firm in
London through a London broker.”); ZHAO, supra note 132, at 72 (“In the 1950’s, foreign
investors held a little more than 2 percent of U.S. securities; by mid-1988 it was nearly 12
percent.”).
135. ZHAO, supra note 134, at 72:
Many countries opened their exchanges for membership by foreign firms in 1980s.
Holding membership in another country’s exchanges is another form of
internationalization. Before December 1997, only 45 nations offered serious market-
opening measures in the World Trade Organization (WTO) context. In December 1997
WTO issued an accord to liberalize worldwide financial markets. The current
agreement commits over 102 WTO members to liberalize their domestic markets and
provide access to foreign financial services providers.
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Internationalization of the world’s securities market has challenged
traditional notions of regulation and enforcement.138 In order to ensure the
operational and informational efficiency of their market, domestic
regulators have been forced to deal with cross-border cases. This means that
they must be in a position to assess the nature of activities within markets
and environments different from their own. As a direct effect of the
globalization, financial and technological innovations, cross-border
activities, cross-asset effects, and broader financial and economic policy
issues are changing.139 Most modern securities markets are regulated on a
national basis and the current territorial approach to regulation may suffer
from numerous weaknesses. Regulators can be captured or pressured by
local interest groups in the securities industry. They can also be subject to
opportunism whilst trying to maximize their personal prestige and act in
favor of their carrier through complicated regulations. 140 Moreover,
different levels of expertise amongst regulators and courts may lead to
problematic interpretation issues.
These arguments clearly show that the securities market is
transboundary, but that does not necessarily mean that Member States
would be able to externalize harm to other Member States if, for instance,
one Member State decided to criminalize insider trading and another did
not. The powerful argument in favor of centralized rule making based on
the risk of externalities between jurisdictions relates to whether divergent
insider trading rules in criminal insider trading matters within the European
Union eventually risk passing negative externalities from one Member State
136. See Scarlata, supra note 134, at 18. “Passing the book” is an expression describing how the
“control of trading is passed between traders at exchanges around the globe. This enables 24 hour
trading of a financial instrument”. It consists in transferring the handling instructions between
trades and mostly concerns foreign exchange and bullion, not equities.
137. See ZHAO, supra note 132, at 70–73.
138. See Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market—A
Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786–89 (1998); Stephen J. Choi, Assessing Regulatory
Responses to Securities Market Globalization, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 631 (2001);
IOSCO, CAUSES, EFFECTS AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
TURBULENCE IN EMERGING MARKETS 63 (1998) [hereinafter IOSCO REPORT], available at
http://www.sc.com.my/wp-content/uploads/eng/html/resources/discussion/ioscosept98.pdf.
What these developments suggest is that the environment of securities regulation no
longer appears to be limited in scope . . . A major implication for regulators in these
jurisdictions therefore, is that they will have to consider whether the regulatory
framework within which they operate has sufficient capacity and appropriate structure
to accommodate a wider and more complex set of objectives.
Id.
139. See IOSCO REPORT, supra note 138, at 63 (“This has certain implications for securities
regulators—and particularly for emerging market regulators. It is likely that they would be
increasingly expected to deal with issues outside of their traditional scope of responsibilities, in
particular, those involving cross-border activity, cross-asset effects and broader financial and
economic policy issues.”).
140. See ZHAO, supra note 134, at 100.
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to another. 141 Domestic criminal laws may not always guarantee a full
internalization of the negative externalities occurring outside the insider’s
home state. If the costs of a legal rule cannot remain in the Member State
that enacted it, centralization should be favored.
2. Race-to-the-bottom
Secondly, the possibility of a race-to-the-bottom in enforcement of
insider trading laws should also be considered. Scholarly literature posits
that some Member States would not be interested in seriously enforcing
insider trading laws, e.g., by enforcing it through very weak enforcement
mechanisms.142 There is, however, no concrete evidence that such a race-to-
the-bottom in this area would take place. One problem is that all Member
States (with one exception, Bulgaria) have de facto criminalized insider
trading, although the level of penalties differs. It is, however, unlikely that
the differences in levels of penalties are merely state attempts to engage in a
race-to-the-bottom, which would lead to a destructive competition in order
to attract insider traders. There is no evidence whatsoever that such a
scenario is likely to occur between European Member States.
Some, specifically Roberta Romano, have even advocated for a race-to-
the-top.143 The race-to-the-top refers to the idea that investors would not be
willing to pay as much for securities of firms incorporated in states that
have a legal regime, which is detrimental to shareholders’ interest, and
overwhelmingly benefit management. The reasoning is that lenders will not
make loans to these firms without compensation for the risk associated with
managers’ lack of accountability. The result would consequently be a rise of
these firms’ cost of capital and a decline of their earnings. For these
reasons, corporate managers have strong incentives to implant their
companies in countries offering rules preferred by investors.144
3. Transaction costs
Thirdly, centralization may allow for transaction cost savings.145 This
argument is often advanced by European legal scholars pleading for
harmonization of private law in Europe and is based on the argument that
differences in legal systems are very complex. 146 With insider trading,
141. VAN DEN BERGH, supra note 70, at 22 (“Consequently, the need to cope with externalities
between legal orders is a major argument in favour of centralized decision-making.”).
142. James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in US Securities Markets, 99 COL. L. REV. 1200, 1237
(1999). See also Merrit B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).
143. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L.,
Econ. & Org. 225, 226 (1985).
144. Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra note 71.
145. Id.
146. This is one of the arguments made by the Danish scholar Ole Lando in favor of
harmonised private law. Ole Lando, Die Regeln des Europäischen Vertragsrecht, in
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issuers and investors may face transaction costs associated with the
international aspect of a trade. Divergences in sanctions and enforcement of
insider trading laws from one country to another may create transaction
costs for issuers and financial institutions in obtaining the information as
well as in undertaking actions to comply with host countries regulation, in
addition to complying with home country regulations. If a company seeks
to export and expand its operations into a foreign country, it faces
transaction costs.147 These transaction costs vary depending on the area of
laws. For example, a commissioner for Internal Market and Services
identified that amongst the 250 EU issuers listed in the United States, the
largest companies spend between $1 million and $10 million per year to
reconcile International Accounting Standards (IAS) to the United States
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP).148
The costs associated with the divergence of regimes may reduce the
advantages of investing internationally and might prevent investors and
companies from participating in the international securities market. From
this point of view, full harmonization would be beneficial since it would
completely eliminate the problem, as companies would only need to comply
with a unique set of regulatory requirements.149 However, so far, there is
little empirical evidence supporting the theory that substantial transaction
cost savings in criminal insider trading would be eliminated by harmonizing
enforcement methods.
4. Internal market
Economic arguments in favor of a harmonization of the enforcement
mechanisms do not seem to be very convincing. There is little evidence of a
particular risk of externalization of transaction costs nor of a race-to-the-
bottom. It also is not clear that the internal market would be endangered
without harmonization of insider trading criminal sanctions. Differences
between legal rules, as has often been stated, only endanger the internal
market when those differences would endanger the free movement of
services, capital goods, or persons.150 Currently, insider trading law seems
not to be a big issue in any of the Member States; there are not many cases
GEMEINSAMES PRIVATRECHT IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 473–74 (Peter-Christian &
Müller-Graff eds., 1993).
147. See ZHAO, supra note 134, at 100–01.
148. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. and Servs., Speech at the
European Fed’n of Accountants’ (FEE) Seminar on Int’l Fin. Reporting Standards (IFRS): EC
Strategy on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and Consistency (Dec. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.iasplus.com//en/binary/europe/0512mccreevyifrs.pdf.
149. See ZHAO, supra note 134, at 101.
150. See Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of
Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 42 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 405 (1999). See also Michael
Faure, Product Liability and Product Safety in Europe: Harmonization or Differentiation?, 53
KYKLOS 467, 471–72 (2000).
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of enforcement of insider trading through criminal law. Hence, the
Commission may have a point if, for instance, one Member State would
fanatically enforce insider trading and systematically throw insiders in jail
whereas others would not and would therefore attract criminal behavior.
There is no evidence of such behavior and hence no evidence that the
current situation would cause any social harm. Moreover, it should also not
be forgotten that investors are informed of the applicable insider trading
laws and the ways in which they are enforced. Hence, in an application of
the Coase Theorem, 151 if one Member State were not, for instance, to
enforce insider trading laws effectively, investors would presumably react
to this by offering lower prices for the concerned shares.
5. Benefits of differentiation
Finally, economic analysis of harmonization and the law and economics
of federalism have often emphasized the substantial benefits of
differentiated legal rules. First, differentiated legal rules allow for the
satisfaction of heterogeneous preferences. This corresponds with the
Tiebout framework of competition between legal orders where citizens are
free to choose the insider trading law that corresponds optimally with and
varies according to their preference.152 In that respect, one advantage of
decentralization is to enable Member States to provide for rules which best
serve the goals preferred by the local population.153 As presented, criminal
law is a traditional State sovereignty matter. Consequently, States are very
attached to their competences in this particular domain of law. Criminal law
embodies States’ cultural, historical, and political specificities and is
particularly representative of local individual preferences. Therefore, the
substantial benefit from differentiation of criminal insider trading
legislation should not be neglected.
Another benefit of differentiated legal rules is that through the
application of different legal rules, substantial learning effects can be
obtained.154 A disadvantage of harmonization at the European level is that
those learning effects would be lost.155 Especially in this new domain of the
enforcement of insider trading, where learning about the most effective
151. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 15 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
152. See Anthony Ogus, Standard Setting for an Environmental Protection, in
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
FRAMEWORK 25–30 (Michael Faure, J. Vervaele & A. Weale eds., 1994); Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
153. Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra note 71. See also Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 281 (1985) (stating that “a
centralized system could impose a welfare loss on firms, to the extent that it would be difficult to
duplicate the important transaction-specific assets that serve to safeguard the interests of the
parties.”).
154. Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra note 71.
155. See VISSCHER, supra note 125, at 84–85.
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methods of enforcing insider trading law may be quite important, learning
from the experiences in different Member States could provide valuable
insights on the most effective tools to remedy insider trading.156 It is likely
that those benefits of mutual learning would be gone in a model of
harmonization of criminal law as the Commission is currently proposing in
its directive.
B. COMMISSION LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: MEMBER STATES’
ENFORCEMENT DEFICIT
Of course, the perspective from the European Commission may be a
totally different one than the economics of federalism. The Commission
would not focus on the economic theory that would address whether there
are inter-jurisdictional externalities or a race-to-the-bottom, but whether
criminal law is needed to encourage compliance with the EU directives
concerning insider trading. This idea to criminalize insider trading should
be seen within the context of the general worry at EU level that there is a
considerable implementation deficit with respect to EU law, although this is
stronger in some areas than in others. Therefore, a major focus of European
law during the past thirty years has been on the issue of how
implementation of European law can be improved by requiring a correct
implementation from Member States. In this respect, we can turn to several
evolutions in case law.
Although Member States remain free in the choice of instruments for
the implementation of a directive, case law holds that these sanctions in
case of a violation of implementing legislation should at least be effective,
proportional, and dissuasive.157 Hence, one can now find in many directives
the obligation for Member States to provide sanctions that are “effective,
proportionate and dissuasive.”158
Case law also held that the lack of effective prosecution against
violators of implementing legislation can be considered as a violation of
European law. 159 Hence, Europe has increasingly received effective
remedies to cope with the implementation deficit. 160 However, most
recently, starting with the environmental crimes directives we mentioned in
the introduction, the EU now also wishes to cure the implementation deficit
156. Van den Bergh & Visscher, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 19
(“Differences in rules allow for different experiences and may improve an understanding of the
effects of alternative legal solutions to similar problems. This advantage relates both to the
formulation of the substantive rules and their enforcement.”).
157. See Case C-68/88, Comm’n of the European Cmntys. v. Hellenic Republic, 1989 E.C.R.
2979.
158. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, art. 7.
159. Case C-265/95, Comm’n of the European Cmntys. v. French Republic (Spanish
Strawberries), 1997 E.C.R. I-06959.
160. See GEERT CORSTENS & JEAN PRADEL, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW (Kluwer Law
International 2002).
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by forcing Member States to choose a particular type of sanction, in this
particular case criminal law. 161 The question can, however, be asked
whether a harmonization of criminal law, as currently proposed, is indeed
necessary to guarantee a correct implementation of European law and, in
this particular case, the Market Abuse Directive.
ESMA’s report presents enforcement of insider trading laws data about
15 Member States for which the information was available for the years
2008, 2009, and 2010.162 As far as insider dealing is concerned, all the
Member States provide criminal sanctions except for Bulgaria.163 Moreover,
one can observe that the 15 countries for which the data is available display
a total of 155 criminal sanctions164 imposed over the entire period; higher
than the total of 101 administrative sanctions. This information does not
seem to support a Member State’s enforcement of criminal insider trading
law deficiency.
1. Effectiveness doubtful
All Member States, with the exception of Bulgaria, do have criminal
sanctions for insider trading, but there are considerable differences in the
modalities of the sanctions. It is unclear whether the differences in
sanctions are necessarily a problem. Sanctions do not only differ between
Member States as far as insider trading is concerned, but also for many
other crimes as well. This very often has to do with the legislative tradition
concerning criminal law in the various Member States. However, these
differences do not indicate that the system of enforcement in one Member
State would necessarily be more effective than in another. In this respect, it
161. A few years ago, Corstens and Pradel, two leading criminal law scholars in Europe, wrote
that “[s]uch a method requiring Member States to use criminal penalties is compatible with neither
the character of a directive, nor the opinion that the communities do not have authority to require
Member States to impose criminal penalties.” Id. This statement was obviously written before the
Lisbon Treaty was enacted.
162. ESMA, supra note 8, at 5.
163. Bulgaria does not provide criminal sanctions for market manipulation either. See
BULGARIA: PROGRESS REPORT AND WRITTEN ANALYSIS BY THE SECRETARIAT OF CORE
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2011), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/Progress%20reports%202y/MONEY
VAL(2011)5_ProgRep2_BLG.pdf.
According to the Bulgarian authorities, at present, a new Concept for Criminal Policy
of the Republic of Bulgaria was adopted in July 2010. The abovementioned Concept
envisages the elaboration and adoption of a new Penal Code. One of the main purposes
of the new Penal Code is to address the necessity to criminalize modern types of
criminal activity, including those provided for under the international agreements
undertaken by the Republic of Bulgaria. The timescale for the drafting and adoption of
the new Penal Code is estimated to be 2014.
It is understood that market manipulation and insider trading are taken into consideration in the
concept of the new Penal Code.
164. ESMA, supra note 8, at 41, 91, 111 (explaining the number of monetary and non-monetary
sanctions imposed on natural and legal persons).
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should be stressed that the sanctions provided for in legislation often just
provide for the maximum penalties, but are not related to what is effectively
imposed by judges. There would, from an economic perspective, only be a
problem if the sanctions provided in legislation would be of such a nature
that it is, taking the economic criteria into account, impossible to impose
effective sanctions for insider trading in practice.
Finally, it should also be stressed that the current Directive will, at least
in the first phase, imply little change. The Directive will merely force
Member States towards criminalization that, with the exception of Bulgaria,
all Member States already do. Regarding the modalities of this
criminalization, for all other Member States, as far as the sanctions are
concerned, three things may change. First, the Directive requires Member
States to provide for criminal liability of legal persons (which is not the
case in eight Member States currently in Europe).165 Second, the Directive
requires the establishment of “intent” to prove guilt in a criminal insider
trading proceeding (which is not the case in ten Member States).166 Third,
the Directive requires a punishment of a maximum term of imprisonment of
at least four years (not the case in seven Member States).167
The remaining differences will hence remain in existence and would
only change if the European Commission would use its powers in Article
12, introducing common minimum rules on the types and levels of criminal
sanctions. However, even if that were the case, one always has to take into
account that it still will be impossible to constrain the prosecution policy of
public prosecutors or the discretionary powers of the judiciary as far as the
application of penalties is concerned. Even if one were hence, according to
Article 12, to harmonize the rules on the types and levels of criminal
sanctions, this may, to a large extent, remain a symbolic window dressing
operation that should not necessarily change anything in the practice of the
Member States, except perhaps facilitating mutual recognition and
cooperation.
It can therefore be concluded that this attempt to harmonize the method
of enforcement of insider trading laws through criminalization at a EU level
will be largely symbolic with limited effects as far as the sanctions that will
be implied in practice on insider trading are concerned.
165. Id. at 73. This does not apply in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Sweden.
166. Id. at 112. Proof of intent is not required in order to have a guilty verdict in a market abuse
case in Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.
167. Id. at 105. The maximum length of imprisonment for insider dealing violations is less than
four years in Belgium, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Estonia and Hungary.
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2. Unconvincing arguments from the Commission
In this respect, the motivation provided by the European Commission
can also be criticized. A first argument in favor of criminal sanctions at the
EU level is that “the sanctions currently in place to fight market abuse
offences are lacking impact and are insufficiently dissuasive which results
in ineffective enforcement of the Directive.”168 In line with this argument,
the Directive explains that “[t]he adoption of administrative sanctions by
Member States has proven to be insufficient to ensure compliance with the
rules on preventing and fighting market abuse” and that “the availability of
criminal sanctions for at least serious market abuse across the Union,
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.”169 These arguments
are, however, hardly convincing.
First, there is no empirical basis for these extreme statements. 170
Second, it remains unclear how the Directive will actually change the
“ineffective enforcement of the Directive.” Indeed, the Directive merely
forces criminalization in one Member State, introduces criminal liability for
legal entities in eight Member States, introduces a higher threshold for mens
rea (intent) for ten Member States, and increases the maximum term of
imprisonment for seven Member States. Its effectiveness concerning
enforcement can be questioned.
Third, the Directive argues that the current “different approaches by
Member States undermine the uniformity of conditions of operation in the
internal market” and even argues that perpetrators would be able “to carry
out market abuse in [jurisdictions] which do not provide for criminal
sanctions for those offences.”171 Here, the Directive relies on a race-to-the-
bottom argument. As previously mentioned, the only Member State for
which this holds true is Bulgaria. According to the Directive, Bulgaria is a
potential haven for insider traders. There is, however, no empirical proof
that Bulgaria will become plagued by insider trading.
Fourth, the Directive stresses the importance of criminal law to
“demonstrate a stronger form of social disapproval compared to
administrative penalties . . . . and sends a message to the public and to
potential offenders that competent authorities take such behaviour very
seriously.” 172 This statement evidences the Commission’s belief in the
“stigma” effect of the criminal law. Moreover, since 27 out of 28 Member
168. Proposal for Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market
Manipulation, supra note 52, at 2.
169. On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note 5, pmbl. recitals 5–6.
170. The Directive refers, for instance, to the evaluation of the national regimes for
administrative sanctions under Directive 2003/6/EC. The call for evidence on the review of the
Market Abuse Directive launched by the Commission on April 20, 2009 mainly focused on the
scope of the Market Abuse Directive and not on the necessity of introducing criminal sanctions at
the EU level. Id. pmbl. recital 2.
171. Id. pmbl. recital 7.
172. Id. pmbl. recital 6.
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States already have criminal sanctions for insider trading in place, one may
question whether European-wide criminal sanctions will have added value.
Finally, the importance of criminal law is also stressed to “improve
deterrence as they demonstrate to potential offenders that the authorities
take serious enforcement action.” 173 Again, this strongly stresses the
symbolic value, not only of criminalization, but also of criminalization at
the EU level. All in all, the main arguments of the Directive are abstract and
symbolic in nature since they mainly rely on consultations and
conferences. 174 Furthermore, the impact assessments provided with the
Directive provides weak support for the Directive’s purpose, which calls
into question its effectiveness.175 This aspect is particularly sensitive since it
raises some concerns regarding compliance with the legal basis of the
Directive. Indeed, Article 83(2) TFEU calls for clear reliance on empirical
data regarding essential criminal sanctions.176The interpretation of Article
83(2) TFEU is critical since the Directive is the first to be adopted based on
the Article.
3. Inconsistency with European policy
Finally, it is remarkable that the European Commission stresses the
need to introduce criminal sanctions in the area of insider dealing and
market manipulation, while following a completely different strategy in the
area of competition policy. For years, European competition policy has
been based on an administrative sanctioning by the European Commission,
not criminal penalties. Many have stressed the importance of introducing
criminal penalties to be applied to more severe violations of competition
law, like sophisticated cartels,177 but these voices have not been heard.178
173. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Criminal
Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation, at 3, SEC (2011) 1217 final (Oct. 20,
2011).
174. Marta Miglietti, The New EU Criminal Law Competence in Action: The Proposal for a
Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 29 (Inst. for Eur.
Studies, Working Paper 5/2013, 2013) (“It is possible to affirm that the consultations and the
conferences did not provide a ‘clear factual evidence’ of ‘the added value of common EU
minimum criminal law standards.”).
175. See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, at 57, SEC (2011) 1217 final
(Oct. 20, 2011) (“In accordance with article 83(2) of the Treaty (TFEU), the introduction of a
requirement for criminal sanctions to address market abuse is likely to lead to increased successful
prosecution of market abuse offences and to contribute to ensuring the effective functioning of the
internal market . . . .”). This statement underlines the fact that the “necessity requirement” of
article 83(2) is not fulfilled. See id. at 176.
176. TFEU, supra note 19, art. 83(2).
177. Wouter Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?, 28 WORLD
COMPETITION 15 (2005).
178. For an overview of EU enforcement of competition policies, see Roger VAN DENBERGH&
MICHAEL FAURE, Critical Issues in the Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Law
and Economics Perspective, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATION: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, THE US AND EUROPE 54–75 (Michael G. Faure & X. Zhang. eds.,
2011).
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Moreover, increasing attention is now given to possibilities of private
enforcement and methods to provide incentives to potential plaintiffs to
bring suits in the area of competition law (introducing treble damages, class
actions, etc.).
It is striking that in the related domain of insider dealing the European
discussion on enforcement mechanisms seems to focus on criminalization
and not, for instance, on ways of improving private enforcement in order to
increase deterrence. This not only shows that there is, apparently, little
consistency in the general enforcement strategy at the EU level, but also
that the Commission should probably learn from the experience with
competition policy to look at methods other than criminalization to improve
enforcement. In that way, criminal law could truly remain an ultimum
remedium.
C. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW:
QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS
The Directive may not be consistent with the principles governing the
introduction of substantive criminal rules at a EU level. For instance, the
Manifesto on European Criminal Policy published in 2009 by the European
Criminal Policy Initiative aimed at clarifying the major principles of
criminal law rooted in European law: the principle of a legitimate purpose,
the ultima ratio principle, the principle of guilt, the principle of legality, the
principle of subsidiarity, and the principle of coherence. 179 The question
arises how those principles relate to the Directive on criminal sanctions for
market abuse.
1. The principle of proportionality
The principles of legitimate purpose, the ultima ratio principle and the
principle of guilt can be perceived as directly emanating from the principle
of proportionality. The principle of proportionality is a fundamental
principle of European law stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 5
TEU.180 It begets the requirement of a legitimate purpose. The resort to
criminalization at EU level could be regarded as proportionate and
legitimate only if a fundamental legal interest worthy of protection against
socially harmful conduct of significant degree can be justified.181 In that
179. EUR. CRIM. POL’Y INITIATIVE, A MANIFESTO ON EUROPEAN CRIMINAL POLICY (2009),
available at http://www.zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2009_12_383.pdf.
180. TEU, supra note 19, art.5.
181. Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi, The Importance of Core Principles of Substantive Criminal Law for
a European Criminal Policy Respecting Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, 1 EUR. CRIM.
L. REV. 7, 15 (2011) (“The requirement of a fundamental interest that is harmed in a socially
significant way would be of particular usefulness in determining when the EU shall be justified in
employing criminal law means to effectively implement its policies under article 83(2) TFEU.”).
See also The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011, 1 EUR. CRIM. L. REV. 86 (2011)
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respect, the need to reach the objectives of the EU cannot constitute a good
motivation for harmonization. Of course, it should be observed that
fundamental legal interests may eventually differ and diverge at national
and European levels.
Second, the ultima ratio principle also plays a major part in this
context. The EU is now capable of binding its Member States as to the
minimum standards of criminal law to larger extent than ever thanks to the
new Article 83(2). With respect to the application of the ultima ratio
principle any criminal law proposal at EU level should come with a
requisite burden to ensure that it is used as a last resort to protect
fundamental interests. 182 Setting even minimum standards in criminal
matters should be a last resort for the EU. The question should then be
whether administrative sanctions could not be at least equally effective to
ensure the effective implementation of the Union’s policy in the area of
insider trading. Wouldn’t administrative law be sufficient to ensure
equivalent protection? Previous legislative initiatives should be carefully
assessed. Where other sanctions have proven insufficient, the EU should
adopt criminal dispositions. 183 Finally, some commentators argue that
harmonization may be perceived as encouraging movement towards an
increased repression, 184 making criminal law the principle method of
punishment.
In that respect, the Regulation provides for administrative sanctions for
non-criminal actions. This is consistent with the idea that there is a softer
alternative to criminal law at EU level. However, both the Regulation and
the Directive were adopted at the same time. This may demonstrate how the
EU did not explore and try all available means before resorting to criminal
law. The need to improve the 2003 MAD does not automatically imply the
need to resort to criminal law.
Third, according to the principle of guilt (nulla poena sine culpa), a
criminal sanction can only be imposed when a criminal act has
affirmatively been proven to be the product of a “guilty mind” and the actor
has the requisite mens rea. In the EU, this principle stems from Article 48
The legislative powers of the EU in relation to criminal law issues should only be
exercised in order to protect fundamental interests if: (1) These interests can be derived
from the primary legislation of the EU; (2) The Constitutions of the Member States and
the fundamental principles of the EU Charter of Fundamentals Rights are not violated,
and (3) The activities in question could cause significant damage to society or
individuals.
182. See Kaiafa-Gbandi, supra note 181, at 18.
183. Martin Böse, The Principle of Proportionality and the Protection of Legal Interests, 1
EUR. CRIM. L. REV. 35 (2011).
184. Peter Asp, The Importance of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Coherence in the
Development of EU Criminal Law, 1 EUR. CRIM. L. REV. 44 (2011) (“[C]riminal law is a legal
area which, by its very nature, is repressive, which (in turn) means that harmonization in this area
will—at least in practice—focus on increased repression.”) (italicization omitted).
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of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.185 Apparently, the principle of guilt
seems to be the one that guided the Commission to require Member States
to establish “intent” to criminally sanction insider trading and to provide for
criminal liability of legal persons. As stated above, the level of culpability
required to prove a person guilty of insider trading varies across the
different Member States, ranging from “negligence” to “intent.” Moreover,
some Member States reject the criminal responsibility of legal persons,
partially because it is incompatible with their conception of the principle of
guilt.186
Finally, some suggest that the proof of intent regime and the criminal
liability of legal persons should be decided at a national level.187 Therefore,
Directive dispositions regarding criminal liability of legal entities, as well
as the degree of culpability (intent) necessary to be found liable, may face
resistance in practice at Member States’ level. Furthermore, in the
Convention on the Protection of the European Union’s Financial Interests,
the EU made exceptions regarding culpability. It accepted that “[t]he
intentional nature of an act or omission . . . may be inferred from objective,
[or] factual circumstances”188 and that “[e]ach Member State shall take the
necessary measures to allow [these persons] to be declared criminally liable
in accordance with the principles defined by its national law . . . .”189
185. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 33, art. 48(1)
(“Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law.”).
186. See Kaiafa-Gbandi, supra note 181, at 31; EUR. CRIM. POL’Y INITIATIVE, supra note 179.
“There are framework decisions that obligate the Member States to impose sanctions on legal
person. However, it should be positively noted that as yet it is up to the Member States whether
they fulfill this obligation by means of criminal law.” Id. at 711.
187. See The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011, supra note 181.
This does not predetermine the answer to the question of whether legal entities can be
held criminally liable. There is a decisive difference between guilt of an individual and
that of a legal entity. Rules concerning criminal liability of legal entities must thus be
elaborated on the basis of criminal law provisions at the national level.
Id. at 88.
In some Member States rules on criminal liability for legal persons would not be
compatible with their concept of the principle of guilt, forming the basis of their
national criminal law system. There are framework decisions that obligate the Member
States to impose sanctions on legal person. However, it should be positively noted that
as yet it is up to the Member States whether they fulfill this obligation by means of
criminal law.
Id. at 95–96.
188. Council Act, Drawing up the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities'
Financial Interests, art.1(4), 1995 O.J. (C 316) 50.
189. Id. art. 3.
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2. Principles of subsidiarity and coherence
According to Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), “the
Union shall, in areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, act
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States.”190 Alternatively, the European
legislation should not intervene in criminal matters when the national
legislator can effectively deal with a given issue. This principle ensures the
protection of the differentiated legal rules and the satisfaction of
heterogeneous preferences. As mentioned above, these preferences are of
particular importance in criminal matters since they reflect national
identities. This restricts the EU’s competence and is related to the principle
of coherence, which states that none shall, without good reason, disturb or
interfere with the coherence of the national criminal law systems.191 In the
case where instruments dealing with criminal matters are enacted, Article
4(2) TEU draws special attention to the coherence of the national criminal
law systems of the Member States. The system’s coherence relies upon the
idea that the entire regime is rooted in historical and cultural national values
that are particularly sensitive to external influence. 192 This principle is
closely related to the notions of democracy, self-governance, and State
sovereignty. In that respect, it seems that not sufficiently convincing
arguments were advanced so far to hold that the national enforcement of
criminal insider trading law has failed.
The above analysis allows one to deduce the following conclusion:
criminal law is the most stringent mechanism of control that deeply affects
fundamental civil liberties. Therefore, any initiative the Commission takes
in that field should be consistent with the principles governing the
introduction of substantive criminal rules at the EU level. In that respect,
the Directive on criminal sanctions may be criticized in various aspects. The
Directive was adopted at the same time as the Regulation, which may also
raise problems regarding the principles of proportionality and the principle
of ultima ratio. The principles of subsidiarity and coherence support the
need to have a differentiation of legal rules.
190. TEU, supra note 19, art. 5.
191. Asp, supra note 184, at 46.
The principle of subsidiarity is founded on the idea that society is built from the bottom
to the top and not the other way around. This means that the central—or in the case of
the EU: the supranational—authorities should fulfill only those tasks that cannot be
fulfilled effectively by actions on a decentralized, local or regional, level. In this way
one ensures that decisions will be taken as closely to the citizens as is possible having
regard to the demands of society.
Id.
192. Id. at 44. See also The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011, supra note 181, at
91 (“[C]riminal law is also a value system, and as such it is a component part of the ‘national
identities’ of the Member states . . .”).
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The point is not to contest the legitimacy of the EU in criminal matters,
but rather to highlight the importance of restraining the content of the
Directive to the strict minimum, in order to facilitate its implementation in a
manner that respects civil liberties and citizens’ preferences. The Treaty of
Lisbon mentions the guarantee of the fundamental rights of the citizen as a
goal. The Directive should therefore reflect this will and should be
consistent with such a guarantee in practice.
Finally, Member States may oppose any future proposals to amend the
Directive by invoking the emergency clause of Article 83(3) TFEU. Indeed,
when legislating on substantive criminal law or criminal procedure,
Member States can express their opposition and refer to the European
Council193 if they believe the proposed Directive touches upon fundamental
aspects of their national criminal justice system194 or breaches one of the
fundamental principles of criminal law outlined above.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has critically analyzed the Directive on criminal sanctions
for market abuse. The core of the Directive is that insider dealing and
market manipulation as defined therein must be criminalized when
committed as an intentional offence, and legal entities will be criminally
liable. Additionally, maximum terms of imprisonment are mandated. We
hold that even though criminal law has some role to play in enforcing
insider trading (more particularly to supplement private and administrative
law enforcement), there is currently little evidence to show that the
enforcement of insider trading laws at the Member State level would be
ineffective. Twenty-seven out of the twenty-eight EU Member States
already utilize criminal law to back up insider trading legislation. Here, the
added value of European legislation is limited. Therefore, the mere
imposition of criminal sanctions at the EU level will not guarantee that the
current problems with the effective enforcement of insider trading law
would be solved. Moreover, the Commission refers to a current “ineffective
enforcement” of insider trading law, but there is little empirical proof in
support Furthermore, the Directive is not entirely consistent with the
principles governing the introduction of substantive criminal rules at the EU
level. Specifically it is not consistent with the ultima ratio principle, the
principle of guilt, and the principles of subsidiarity and coherence.
Based on the economic theory of harmonization, if there is a need to
criminalize insider trading under specific circumstances, then that need
cannot be sustained at this stage. Additionally, the Directive on criminal
sanctions for market abuse may be qualitatively criticized. Thus, there are
193. Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 13.
194. Denmark and the United Kingdom are not adopting this Directive and are therefore not
bound by it or subject to its application. See On Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, supra note
5, pmbl. recitals 29, 31.
2015] Towards Harmonizing Insider Trading Criminal Law 427
both legal and economic reasons for criticizing this first Directive adopted
on the basis of Article 83(2).
